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Reparations for the Transatlantic Slave Trade and Historical Enslavement: 
Linking past atrocities with contemporary victim populations 
Luke Moffett* and Katarina Schwarz** 
 
Reparations are often seen as victim-centred measures to address past atrocities, but how far in the 
past should such remedies stretch? This question is perhaps most pronounced with the transatlantic 
slave trade, which is now accepted as a horrendous atrocity, but at the time was legal and victims 
were not redressed. Although reparations have a strong basis in international law since the Second 
World War, governments often adopt such measures through political settlements to draw a line under 
the past and provide new opportunities for victims. Reparations, at least in the legal arena, can 
embody a contention between societal feasibility and individual and/or group rights to a remedy for 
harm caused to them. Yet the extent to which legal and political measures of reparations can address 
the past is strained, due to the size of the victim population and how long ago historic violations were 
committed.  
In 2013 the Caribbean Heads of State created the CARICOM Reparations Commission to 
advance the case for reparations for the transatlantic slave trade. In 2014 the Commission launch a 
Ten Point Plan for reparations that seeks ‘to provide resources to victimized groups with the aim of 
creating the material basis and security necessary for them to become full participants in social, 
political, and economic life.’1 The demands focus on: (1) full formal apology; (2) repatriation; (3) 
indigenous peoples development program; (4) cultural institutions; (5) public health crisis; (6) 
illiteracy eradication; (7) African knowledge program; (8) psychological rehabilitation; (9) technology 
transfer; and (10) debt cancellation. These proposals for a comprehensive reparations package dealing 
with the horrors of transatlantic enslavement by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) move away 
from the traditional reparations claim for these injustices in the United States – the demand for ‘40 
acres and a mule’2 – to more collective reparations aimed at delivering closure and reparatory justice, 
not only for the so-called ‘transatlantic slave trade’, but also for the consequences of colonialism and 
genocide against indigenous people.3 These proposals are the result of a long line of discussions 
amongst Caribbean and African states on reparations for the transatlantic slave trade that started at the 
international level in Abuja, Nigeria in April 1993 at First Pan-African Congress on Reparations and 
later in 2001 United Nations World Conference against Racism, Discrimination, Xenophobia, and 
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Related Intolerance in Durban South Africa.4 While the claim for reparations at Durban was strongly 
rejected by Western states, it continues to be pursued by Caribbean nations through CARICOM, 
aiming to tackle the contemporary consequences of historical abuse committed against their ancestors 
during the transatlantic slave trade.5 
This article takes a socio-legal approach drawing from human rights law, victimology, private 
law and transitional justice to examine the case of claim reparations for historic violations. It argues 
that while a collective approach to reparations as promoted by CARICOM is likely to be more 
palatable for responsible states, and more workable in legal terms, there remain serious legal 
challenges in finding sufficient evidence of a causal nexus between contemporary suffering and 
historical wrongs to satisfy judicial requirements. Paired with the difficulty of establishing that the 
wrongdoing was prohibited in law at the time the acts were committed, this leads away from the 
conclusion that a legal claim would be successful. However, in political terms specific evidentiary 
requirements and the distinction between law and morality can be more flexible, allowing claims 
which might not succeed on the basis of legal doctrine to conclude on the basis of justice. The 
CARICOM claim targets the modalities of reparations to respond to the contemporary consequences 
of transatlantic enslavement. A political settlement drawing from the experience of transitional justice 
is therefore likely to be more appropriate in providing redress. As such, this article critically assesses 
the CARICOM claim for reparations, and suggests appropriate measures if political reparations were 
to be made. 
We explore these issues in four parts. First we examine reparations as justice and their 
construction in international law, discussing growing victimological understanding of redress for 
international crimes. In the second part we identify the continuing limitations of reparations being 
claimed under current legal regimes whether domestic or international. We broaden this examination 
by considering reparations as a political project in the third part, discussing other political settlements 
made for historical atrocities. In the final part we reflect on the possibilities of reparations for the 
transatlantic slave trade and historic enslavement before concluding. While we argue that the 
possibility for reparations for the transatlantic slave trade on a legal basis is unlikely, we do believe 
that in setting aside the legal lens on dealing with historic atrocities, there can be a larger space for 
states involved in the transatlantic slave trade on a moral and political basis to recognise the harm 
caused and make symbolic reparations. Of course this does not have the same force or binding as law, 
it would allow acknowledgement of the wrongfulness of the trade and greater focus in addressing the 
long term consequences of the transatlantic slave trade. 
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1. REPARATIONS AS JUSTICE 
Reparations are premised on the attempt to redress wrongful acts. Rather than seeking distributive 
justice or absolute equality, legal reparations focus on providing a remedy for specific acts of 
wrongdoing with identifiable victims and perpetrators. Reparations in this legal context, serve a 
tripartite function in satisfying the demands of justice by: vindicating the law; placing obligations to 
repair on the shoulders of responsible actors; and providing for the needs of the victims by redressing 
their suffering and manifesting their right to a remedy for breaches of their rights. Justice demands 
that breaches of law be met with an appropriate remedy, and reparations as a justice mechanism are a 
means by which this can be comprehensively granted. Reparations, extending beyond mere 
compensation, are constituted of three key elements: acknowledgement; responsibility; and remedy.6 
They therefore reflect the totality of situations of wrongdoing and victimisation, rather than simply 
addressing the consequences.   
Within a rectificatory framework, justice requires the return of the victim and the perpetrator 
to equality by removing any unlawful gain from the perpetrator and returning it to the victim, a sort of 
transactional arrangement.7 Restitutionary justice, as a form of this, attempts to return victims to the 
status quo ante (original position) through restitutio in integrum (returning to the victim all they have 
lost). The Chorzow Factory case demonstrates the primacy of the principle of restitution in integrum 
in international law: 
reparations must, as far as possible, wipe-out all the consequences of the illegal 
act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if 
that act had not been committed.8 
However, when dealing with massive, widespread, or severe abuses, the principle of restitutio in 
integrum becomes increasingly unfeasible. It is impossible to return victims to the positions that they 
would have been in but for the wrongdoing.9 As Minow identifies, ‘no market measures exist for the 
value of living an ordinary life, without nightmares or survivor guilt’.10 At best reparations can never 
completely ‘efface’ the harm caused, but they can at least alleviate continuing suffering and loss,11 or 
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 4
offer the opportunity and means for victims to build new lives.12 In relation to enslavement, it would 
be inappropriate to base reparations on the notion of return to the status quo ante, as redress to those 
who directly suffered would be ‘impossible, insufficient, and inadequate’.13 Moreover, returning the 
individual to their personal and property rights before the violation would neglect the more structural 
causes of victimisation, marginalisation and discrimination.14 Nevertheless, reparations based on 
dealing with the continuing harms and recognition of the moral wrongdoings perpetrated may still be 
appropriate.15  
The intergenerational nature of claims relating to historical injustices erodes the basis of 
reparations claims. Identifying a causal nexus between the continuing suffering of contemporary 
descendants and the original wrongdoing becomes increasingly difficult as time passes. In the case of 
racialised transatlantic enslavement, intervening factors also contribute to the harms experienced by 
descendants – apartheid, colonialism, black codes, segregation, international debts and other 
discriminatory practices all contribute to current suffering in a way that at least obscures, and at most 
completely overrides, the historically based claims. Judicial practice tends to recognise the claims of 
direct victims and their immediate family (children, spouses, parents and sometimes siblings), but 
rarely strays beyond these limits on claimants.16 Hill argues that compensatory justice seems 
inappropriate past one generation, the passage of time mitigates the physical harm or is 
accommodated, but there may still be grounds for claiming restitution of property or unjust 
enrichment for the non-payment of labours of ancestors.17 This approach denies the broader impact of 
injustices on families and communities, acknowledging only the harms to the direct victims, and 
perhaps their next-of-kin. 
While individual physical harm may be accommodated within a generation, systematic and 
structural abuses that continue to harm subsequent generations do not necessarily naturally change 
over time, and may reinforce disenfranchisement and discriminatory practices towards such groups 
and communities. An increasing body of psychological research supports the transgenerational impact 
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Rights in Loayza Tamayo v Peru, paras 147–148. 
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of January 22, 1999. Series C No. 48, para.42. 
14 Heidi Rombouts and Stephan Parmentier, The International Criminal Court and its Trust Fund are Coming of 
Age: Towards a Process Approach for the Reparation of Victims, International Review of Victimology 16 (2009) 
149–182. 
15 Cristian Correa, Reparations for Victims of Massive Crimes: Making Concrete a Message of Inclusion, in in 
R. Letschert, R. Haveman, A.M. de Brouwer, and A. Pemberton (eds), Victimological Approaches to 
International Crimes: Africa (Intersentia 2011), 185–234, p189-190. 
16 See for instance the Swiss Holocaust Settlement experience - Judah Gribetz and Shari C. Reig, The Swiss 
Banks Holocaust Settlement, in C. Ferstman, M. Goetz, and A. Stephens (eds.), Reparations for Victims of 
Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: Systems in Place and Systems in the Making, (Martinus 
Nijhoff 2009), 115-142. 
17 See René A. Hill, Compensatory Justice: Over Time and Between Groups, The Journal of Political 
Philosophy, 10(4) (2002), 392–415; and Jeremy Waldron, Redressing Historic Injustice, The University of 
Toronto Law Journal 52 (2002), 135-160. 
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of unaddressed collective violence, whether this continuing influence manifests in terms of economic 
hardship, psychological health, physical health, or through its effects on carer responsibilities for 
children and grandchildren of direct victims.18 The increasing focus on rehabilitation and the 
medicalisation of victims’ harm, may recast victims as sick, rather than wronged. Whether the law is 
an appropriate mechanism for redressing such harms remains debateable, as the typical focus of 
judicial proceedings relies on the relationship between a perpetrator or responsible actor and each 
victim as an individual. Arendt goes so far as to say that the scale of mass atrocities ‘explode the 
limits of the law’,19 and that courts and their legal principles designed to deal out ordinary justice are 
insufficient to grapple with such atrocities.  
In attempting to make the incomprehensible justiciable, courts can serve as empowering 
mechanisms whereby the individual agency and rights of victims are recognised and vindicated. On 
the other hand, the focus on the individual’s rights can undermine the gravity of the holistic 
experience of atrocities that target groups, communities or populations. The tendency of legal 
proceedings to individualise victims can ignore important elements of the suffering of the victims: 
atrocities were committed on a large scale; they were targeted for some aspect of their fundamental 
identity; or they were denied humanity on the basis of particular, morally arbitrary characteristics. 
Courts can provide victims with an official forum in which their stories are heard and recognised; the 
value of testimony in fostering psychological healing for victims of atrocities is significant.20 Yet, the 
appropriateness of court proceedings for accomplishing such healing and redress faces a number of 
limitations discussed further below.  
Reparations are not purely (or even necessarily primarily) concerned with practical redress, 
they also have an important symbolic component in that they can ‘acknowledge and recognise the 
individual’s suffering … can help concretise a traumatic event, aid an individual to come to terms 
with it and help label responsibility.’21 Traumatic suffering is characterised by the inability to come to 
terms with an experience as it occurs, reinforcing the importance of efforts aimed towards 
acknowledgement and memory building.22 Reparations in this context can reflect ‘social, moral, 
psychological and religious meanings’ attached to official efforts to redress the past, such as public 
apologies and acknowledgement of responsibility, memorials and commemorations.23  Such public 
                                                     
18 Marie Breen-Smyth, The needs of individuals and their families injured as a result of the Troubles in 
Northern Ireland, WAVE Trauma Centre (2012); Yael Danieli, Massive Trauma and the Healing Role of 
Reparative Justice, in Ferstman n.12, 41-78. 
19 L. Kohler and H. Saner (eds), Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers: Correspondence: 1926–1969, (Harcourt 
Brace International 1992), p54. 
20 Danieli n.14, p45. 
21 Brandon Hamber, Repairing the irreparable: Dealing with the double-binds of making reparations for crimes 
of the past, Ethnicity and Health 5(3/4) (2000) 215-226, p218. 
22 Cathy Caruth, Trauma: Explorations of Memory (John Hopkins University Press, 1995), p70. 
23 Geneviève Painter, cited in Anne Saris and Katherine Lofts, Reparation Programmes: A Gendered 
Perspective, in Ferstman et al. n.12, 79-99, p86. 
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recognition and physical space can help victims in their grieving process by offering focal points that 
maintain the memory of their loved one.   
Through symbolic redress, reparations can also speak to the moral harms caused by 
victimisation – the intangible damage to individual, collective and cultural identity – and aid in 
reasserting the status of victims in their relationship with society and/or the perpetrator(s). As Herman 
states: 
Sharing the traumatic experience with others is a precondition for the restitution of 
a sense of a meaningful world…Restoration of the breach between the traumatized 
person and the community depends, first, upon public acknowledgement of the 
traumatic event and, second, upon some form of community action. Once it is 
publicly recognized that a person has been harmed, the community must take 
action to assign responsibility for the harm and to repair the injury. These two 
responses – recognition and restitution – are necessary to rebuild the survivor’s 
sense of order and justice.24 
Particularly in transitional societies, reparations can serve a political function in rebuilding the 
victim’s ‘civic trust’ with other citizens and in the state, and reaffirming their dignity by prioritising 
their suffering as deserving of redress.25 This sits in stark contrast to the past where they were vilified, 
dehumanised and targeted. In building this new political community, social solidarity and inclusion is 
extended to victims as citizens entitled to a remedy. While of course there are not enough resources to 
fully or completely remedy victims’ harm, Hamber suggests the notion of ‘good enough’, whereby 
sufficient effort and recognition is made to victims to leave them psychologically satisfied, in turn 
rebuilding community and societal bonds.26  
As a victim-centred form of redress with both material and symbolic components, reparations 
are not only driven by outcomes, but also by procedural roles and the inclusivity of awards. 
Procedural justice is concerned with improving victims’ satisfaction with state programmes, mainly 
criminal justice processes, by treating them fairly, with respect and in such a way that they will 
perceive that their input is valued.27 Allowing time and space within procedures for victims to be 
heard (even when this is not a formal requirement of, for instance, trial procedures) can support 
recognition of their experiences, and the reassertion of their identity and place in society. Official 
                                                     
24 Judith Herman, Trauma and Recovery: From Domestic Abuse to Political Terror, (Rivers Oram Press, 1994), 
p70. 
25 Lisa Magarrell, Reparations for massive or widespread human rights violations: Sorting out claims for 
reparations and social justice, Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 22 (2003) 85–98, p91. 
26 Brandon Hamber, The dilemmas of reparations: In search of a process-driven approach, in K. De Feyter, S. 
Parmnetier, M. Bossuyt and P. Lemmens (eds.), Out of the Ashes: Reparation for Victims of Gross and 
Systematic Human Rights Violations (Intersentia 2005), 135-149, p137. 
27 Jo-Anne Wemmers, Victims’ Need for Justice in R Letschert et al. n.11, 145–152. 
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acknowledgement of victims’ ‘world view’ on their past victimisation, the causes that gave rise to it, 
and those responsible can be a way of affirming their dignity as human beings, recognising that they 
did not deserve to suffer such harm. Danieli goes as far to say that inclusion of victims in itself offers 
‘an opportunity for redress and healing’.28 In this way, the procedures through which reparations are 
granted can acknowledge the importance of victims’ agency and worth, and victims thereby have an 
important role to play in shaping appropriate reparations.  
Including victims as active participants in reparations procedures is particularly important in 
the context of gross violations of human rights where victims are denied basic humanity through the 
abuses, and where impunity often attaches to wrongdoing (particularly in transitional societies and 
when official actors played a role in the abuses).29 The nature and subsequent treatment of the abuses, 
and the need to maintain public order can silence and obviate victims, denying the occurrence or 
severity of their harm. Ensuring the involvement of victims in redress processes can ensure that their 
experiences are recognised, their rights are vindicated, and their needs are incorporated into any 
reparations packages. Despite the normative growth and theoretical development of reparations, there 
remain a number of legal challenges to seeking redress for the transatlantic slave trade. 
2. THE LIMITS OF REPARATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The possibility of pursuing a case claiming reparations for the transatlantic slave trade in domestic 
courts is severely inhibited by the difficulties associated with mass claim actions, time limits on 
claims, rules on standing and separation of powers based principles, such as the political question 
doctrine in the United States.30  The scale and collective nature of the harms in question, on top of 
these impediments, make international law the only likely forum for such a reparations claim. 
However, international law has many hurdles of its own. Here we identify three main obstacles in 
domestic and international law that will inhibit or prevent reparations claims for the transatlantic slave 
trade and historic enslavement: non-retroactivity; causation; and attribution of responsibility. 
2.1 Non-Retroactivity 
By today’s standards, the transatlantic slave trade and historic enslavement would undoubtedly 
amount to a crime against humanity.31 However international law, like domestic law, enshrines the 
principle of non-retroactivity as a fundamental tenet of the legal system.32 The Articles on State 
Responsibility, for instance, guarantee protection against retrospective application of international 
                                                     
28 Danieli n.14, p66. 
29 Luke Moffett, Transitional Justice and Reparations: Remedying the Past?, in C. Lawther, L. Moffett and D. 
Jacobs, Research Handbook on Transitional Justice, Elgar (forthcoming 2017). 
30 See In re African-American Slave Descendants Litigation 471 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2006). 
31 Article 7(1)(c), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
32 Article 15, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and Article 24, Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court. 
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law, stipulating that ‘An act of a State does not constitute a breach of an international obligation 
unless the State is bound by the obligation in question at the time the act occurs.’33 In order to found a 
legal claim for reparations, it must therefore be established that the acts in question were contrary to 
international law at the time that the acts were committed. This is not supported under current 
conceptions of the development of the prohibition of slavery, which is generally recognised as having 
come into existence in 1926.34  
Although morally repugnant, slavery was legal and regulated under domestic law of the time, 
as well as the tentative ‘international’ law of the time.35 The dominance of this understanding of the 
status of prohibition is apparent in a number of cases before Umpire Bates of the United States-Great 
Britain Mixed Commission involving the actions of British authorities who seized US ships involved 
in the slave trade and freed slaves belonging to US nationals. Umpire Bates had to determine whether 
slavery was ‘contrary to the law of nations’ at the time of each incident in order to determine whether 
the British state had committed acts of unlawful interference with the property of foreign nationals in 
freeing the American slaves. The commission found such unlawful interference in cases preceding 
recognised prohibition, but later found no breach once the slave trade was recognised as being 
‘prohibited by all civilized nations’.36 
International law is primarily premised on the consent of State Parties to the rules contained 
therein. It is therefore important that there has been consensus achieved through the conclusion of 
treaties or, as du Plessis points out, that international law has crystallised around an issue through 
wide state practice and observance – principles of morality are insufficient as a basis of international 
prohibitions.37 Unlike the initial codification of international criminal law through the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, there was no ‘defining moment’ in the criminalisation of slavery.38 Shelton acknowledges 
that ‘slavery became illegal under international law slowly and in piecemeal fashion, starting over a 
century after the transatlantic slave trade began and as a result of opposition that existed from the start 
and grew stronger over time.’39 The fact that transatlantic enslavement was an abhorrent act at the 
time cannot therefore, in itself, serve as the basis of legal liability, nor can the now recognised special 
status of the prohibition against slavery in international law. Even the jus cogens (non-derogable) 
                                                     
33 Article 13, Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts.  
34 Slavery Convention 1926, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 60, p.253-270. Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann 
and Anthony P. Lombardo, Framing Reparations Claims: Differences between the African and Jewish Social 
Movements for Reparations, African Studies Review 50(1) (2007), 27-48, p30. 
35 See Jean Allain, Slavery in International Law (MNP, 2013). 
36 See Commentaries to the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Report 
of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session (2001), p57-58. 
37 Max du Plessis, Historical Injustice and International Law: An Exploratory Discussion of Reparation for 
Slavery, Human Rights Quarterly, 25(3) (2003), 624-659, p634. 
38 Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice, (Penguin 2000), p209. 
39 Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (OUP 2005, 2nd edn.), p443. 
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nature of the prohibition against slavery cannot obviate the principle of non-retroactivity of 
responsibility.40  
Even if there were a legal basis for reparations on the transatlantic slave trade, there would be 
limits on the scale of such redress. Reparations under international law are not limitless. The Articles 
on State Responsibility are couched in terms of proportionality with restitution only granted where it 
is not ‘materially impossible’ or would ‘involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit deriving 
from restitution instead of compensation.’41 This of course does not prevent states from agreeing to 
political settlements over historic injustices, it only prevents the international legal order being used as 
a remedial avenue.  
2.2 Causation 
It is a general principle of private, criminal and international law that harm caused to a victim capable 
of being redressed through judicial mechanisms must be the result of a wrong or crime committed by 
the responsible party on trial.42 As a legal construct, reparations do not seek to address all suffering, 
but rather the specific damages which result from particular wrongdoing; compensable harms are 
those sufficiently proximate consequences which are causally connected to the illegal acts in question. 
The nature of this causation for claims of reparations in law requires a victim to have suffer in fact 
from a wrong committed by a responsible party, with sufficient legal rules to permit such a wrong to 
give rise to a legal cause. The Articles on State Responsibility do not define the causal link required to 
found a legal claim, as different areas of international law contain obligations of a different nature.43 
However, the commentaries do note that factual causation alone is not the sole criterion.44 This makes 
it clear that there is a distinction in the law between factual and legal causation.  
Factual causation is established by a direct connection between the wrongs in question and 
the damages suffered as a result of the wrong in question. In other words, the harm would not have 
occurred, but for the wrongdoing. Factual causation may be easily proved in relation to direct victims 
of injustice, but it becomes increasingly difficult to identify as time passes and other factors interact 
with the original wrongdoing to perpetrate and perpetuate harm. Howard-Hassmann and Lombardo, 
comparing reparations claims for the Jewish Holocaust with those relating to transatlantic 
enslavement, note that the causal nexus between direct victims and those responsible was more 
apparent in the first wave of claims against the Nazi government only a few years after the Holocaust, 
                                                     
40 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain) (Judgement) (Merits), 
International Court of Justice, ICJ GL No 50, [1970] ICJ Rep 3, 5 February 1970 (Barcelona Traction case), 
para. 34; Du Plessis, n.33, p636; and para.5-6, ILC commentaries.  
41 Article 35(a)-(b), article 37(3). See Du Plessis n.33, p630. 
42 For instance, Article 75(2) of the Rome Statute. 
43 James Crawford The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility (Cambridge University 
Press 2002),  p492-3, and para.10. 
44 ILC Commentaries, para.10. 
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which became more difficult for more indirect victims in subsequent years.45 For instance with 
subsequent claims in the 1990s against private corporations such as Swiss banks, the harm was more 
removed as many of the direct survivors had died, and it was their next-of-kin or heirs making claims.  
Ultimately, the Swiss banks Holocaust settlement recognised that not all heirs for the purpose 
of personal injury claims should be eligible for compensation as it would dilute the amount of money 
available to those directly harmed given the limited nature of the funds.46 Although this conclusion 
resulted in large part from the financial limitations of the situation, a clear distinction was drawn 
between direct and subsequent victims premised on the strength and proximity of the causal nexus. 
This would pose even greater challenges in reparation claims for transatlantic enslavement, as these 
have passed through several additional generations than had the claims in the Swiss banks settlement.  
Legal causation seeks to establish not only which consequences are connected to the 
wrongdoing, but which connected harms ought to be redressed by the wrongdoer in any given case. 
Legal causation therefore requires an assessment of remoteness, foreseeability, and proximity.47 
Remoteness and proximity are both premised on the notion that the consequences of any human act 
are far-reaching, potentially infinite, and often impossible to accurately assess. Given the scale of the 
transatlantic slave trade as with other contemporary international crimes, the scale and extent of harm 
can stretch the limits of the law and adequacy of remedies, therefore there must be some form of 
limits on what redress is possible and feasible. As the Inter-American Court of Human Rights stated:  
Every human act produces diverse consequences, some proximate and others 
remote. An old adage puts it as follows: causa causæ est causa causati. Imagine 
the effect of a stone cast into a lake; it will cause concentric circles to ripple over 
the water, moving further and further away and becoming ever more 
imperceptible. Thus it is that all human actions cause remote and distant effects. 
To compel the perpetrator of an illicit act to erase all the consequences produced 
by his action is completely impossible, since that action caused effects that 
multiplied to a degree that cannot be measured.48 
The law must therefore draw a distinction at some point between proximate and remote harms, in 
order to avoid infinitely varying and ethereal consequences coming within the purview of a specific 
cause of action. The principle of foreseeability is embedded in the bilateral nature of judicial 
proceedings: claims are not only constituted by victims, but are levied against a specific actor who is 
                                                     
45 Howard-Hassmann and Lombardo n.30 
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to be made liable for the consequences of his or her wrongdoing.49 Justice in the legal context is 
concerned with enforcing proportionate culpability on the offender as well as vindicating the rights of 
victims. As Shelton notes, ‘[t]he line drawn inevitably demands policy determinations about the 
reasonableness of expecting an actor to have foreseen the specific consequences of the action taken 
and about which party should most appropriately bear the loss.’50  
Despite requiring distinctions between compensable and non-compensable harms, rules 
regarding remoteness, proximity and foreseeability are not so restrictive as to provide redress only for 
direct harms – responsibility may be attributed on an indirect basis. Perpetrators may be held 
responsible for damages resulting from the actions of another, but which were the foreseeable and 
proximate consequence of the wrongdoing. Thus the Iraqi government was held responsible for ‘any 
direct loss, damage, including environmental damage’ suffered ‘as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion 
and occupation of Kuwait’ – even in cases where Kuwaiti oil wells were hit by Coalition bombing.51 
The extent of indirect liability can thus accommodate liability of a wrongdoer even where another, 
independent actor is more directly connected to the damage, provided that causation is established. In 
the case of the transatlantic slave trade the role of private organisations and individuals in the 
enslavement, transport, sale and use of individuals for slavery would have to be scoped, 
acknowledged and addressed by any proposed reparations programme. 
The passage of time in and of itself can impact on establishing causation, as private law 
principles of attenuation or the existence of intervening acts can break a link in the chain of causation 
between the perpetrator’s wrongdoing and the victims’ harm.52 The principle of attenuation recognises 
that the more remote an action is from the claimed consequences, the more difficult it will be for a 
court to find a clear causal connection.  Just as the impact of an illegal police procedure on evidence 
can ‘become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint’,53 so too can the effect of wrongdoing on a victim 
become so far removed over time as to destroy the causal nexus.  
Intervening actions and events which impact upon the victim can similarly weaken the causal 
chain, and such events may be so significant as to completely override the original wrongdoing as a 
cause of current harms. In the case of enslavement of African people and their descendants in the 
United States, for instance, the institution of slavery was succeeded by segregation, lynching, 
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redlining, police brutality, and other forms of racial discrimination which severely impacted on the 
lives and outcomes of people of African descent in the US.54 This makes establishing the original 
enslavement as a continuing causative factor in contemporary suffering particularly difficult. As each 
generation passes, the causal connection further degrades posing increasing difficulties for the 
descendants of enslaved persons who are now several generations removed from the direct victims of 
enslavement and who are faced with a slew of intervening factors contributing to identified harms. 
However, these factors may be considered to diminish the impact of original wrongdoing upon the 
victims, rather than completely severing the chain of causation. In such a case, the amount of 
reparation or damages awarded could be reduced on the principle of mitigation.  
2.3 Attribution of Responsibility 
A legal claim for redress, premised on the need to do justice between wrongdoers and victims, 
requires the attribution of responsibility for wrongful acts to an extant legal entity or person. In civil 
cases, personal claims can only be brought in personam (against a person), barring such claims 
premised upon individual wrongdoing in relation to historical enslavement where no direct 
perpetrators survive. Actions in rem (against a thing) may be transmitted to actors other than the 
original perpetrator; however there are serious difficulties in constructing such claims in relation to 
enslavement generally as the primary rights sought to be vindicated do not relate to wrongs against 
property, but wrongs committed against persons.55 The claim for unjust enrichment based on the 
unpaid labour of enslaved persons seeks to create such an in rem action. This is proposed as crafting a 
constructive trust around the sum of money representative of the unpaid labour, and transmitting 
obligations in relation to such money down the lines of inheritance of successive generations.56 The 
doctrine of laches (lack of diligence in making a speedy claim), detrimental reliance and undue 
hardship principles, combined with the difficulty of tracing sufficient funds through multiple 
generations in the majority of cases would make claims against contemporary heirs near impossible in 
practice.57 Arguing for the transmission of the beneficial interest in the constructive trust would prove 
even more difficult in such a context, as no established right to inherit exists within the legal systems 
in question.  
In the case of a claim against a state, continued responsibility is understood in terms of the 
rules of state succession. Because the political identity of the relevant European states has remained 
largely constant since the period of transatlantic enslavement, responsibility may be attributed to the 
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governments of these states. In the Mau-Mau case against the United Kingdom government, the UK 
argued that atrocities committed by colonial government were attributable to Kenyan government. 
This argument was rejected on the grounds that there were comprehensive and voluminous records in 
the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office that detailed the role of the former War Office and 
Colonial Office in using torture to restore law and order in Kenya under the colonial administration. 
Moreover, despite a statute of limitations to time bar civil claims against responsible actors,58 the Mau 
Mau case was an exception given it was a settlement. The rules were also found to be more flexible 
with the court stating that there exists ‘the widest possible discretion, within bounds, to enable claims 
for personal injury to proceed outside the general limitation period where the justice of the case so 
requires.’59  
 Establishing responsibility for companies, such as those who facilitated the transport of 
individuals into slavery, would be difficult in legal terms, given that many of these companies no 
longer exist or have changed ownership or merged with other corporations multiple times. Such basis 
for reparations may be on political ground given the public pressure that can be placed on slavery 
profiting companies, some of whom have funded scholarships to descendants of slaves.60 In addition, 
there are strict limits on individuals bringing civil cases against other states and state actors, given the 
rules on state immunity even for recent violations.61 Accordingly, the legal limitations inhibiting 
historical claims from successfully obtaining reparations within the judicial arena are significant, and 
the likelihood of a legal ruling in favour of such a case is limited. It may be more apposite to frame 
such reparation claims on a more political basis on the moral wrongfulness of the atrocities, which 
may require taking compensation off the table. 
3. REPARATIONS AS A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT 
Reparations in relation to severe, historical, and state-perpetrated injustices do not rise or fall only 
within the bounds of judicial systems. In such cases reparations can, and often are, constructed within 
the political arena where they are built as a political ‘project’62 or ‘settlement’ for a class or group of 
victims.63 Judicially constructed reparations can respond to individual harms and the unique situations 
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of different victims. However in doing so courts can disaggregate victims and cause discrepancies 
between reparations for victims in similar situations on the basis of available evidence and diverging 
decisions. 64 Some victims are likely to be entirely excluded from judicial processes because of strict 
evidentiary burdens; standards which are particularly difficult to meet in the context of historical 
abuses or situations of civil unrest. Political reparations allow for evidentiary requirements to be eased 
reflecting the reality of the situation in question. 
Reparations adopted as part of a transitional or historical redress of the past are positioned to 
send political and moral messages as to the wrongfulness of the harm caused to victims, vindicating 
their civic status and providing appropriate remedies as part of society’s solidarity with their plight.65 
According to de Greiff reparations can serve a truth-telling function by helping to clarify the past and 
‘awaken empathy with victims’.66 Hamber suggests that while reparations may not be comprehensive 
and full, where there is sufficient effort and recognition made to victims can be seen as ‘good 
enough’, leaving them psychologically satisfied, in turn rebuilding community and societal bonds.67 
Five general principles assist in assessing the effectiveness of any reparations process: (1) 
completeness and comprehensiveness; (2) complexity and coherence; (3) appropriateness and 
proportionality; (4) acknowledgement; and (5) transformative justice. The first of these, completeness 
and comprehensiveness, involves as far as possible including all atrocities and victims who have 
suffered serious harm.68 This does not necessarily require the inclusion of all possible victims, but 
rather that the parameters of the reparations programme are clear. Completeness in this context refers 
to the coverage of relevant potential beneficiaries with consideration for the evidentiary standards 
imposed, and measures taken to ensure reparations are accessible. Comprehensiveness relates to the 
category of violated rights, which are redressed through a range of measures (restitution, 
compensation, rehabilitation, measures of satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition) to address 
breaches of a wider variety of rights.  
Secondly, reparations mechanisms are considered complex when they provide for different 
types of reparations, individual and collective measures. Such measures should be internally and 
externally coherent with the reparations order and complement other transitional justice approaches 
such as trials and truth commissions.69 Third, proportionality requires that the redress granted to the 
victims is reflective of the harms that they suffered as a result of the breach of their rights. Human 
rights reparation principles support that awards should not enrich or impoverish victims, but be equal 
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to their harm.70 Fourthly, acknowledgement ‘symbolize[s] a society's undertaking not to forget or 
deny that a particular injustice took place, and to respect and help sustain a dignified sense of identity 
in memory for the people affected.’71  
Lastly, transformative justice moves toward tackling the structural causes of violence and 
victimisation, such as racial discrimination, rather than merely the symptoms. Gready and Robins 
point to transformative justice confronting social exclusion and focus on an inclusive process over 
outcomes as well as challenging unequal power relations.72 This approach would indicate a more 
consultative role for descendants of the transatlantic slave trade in redressing the continuing structural 
violations that they face. Some scholars consider transformative justice to align more closely to 
notions of distributive justice than to the restitutionary model of legal redress in its attempt to 
‘recognise unjust distributions of resources and seek to redistribute accordingly, ensuring that 
underlying causes of injustice are addressed.’73 In many situations of grave or systemic injustice, it 
would be inappropriate to focus on the restitutionary objective of return to the status quo ante in 
constructing reparations as it is often that very paradigm which created the conditions from which the 
wrongdoing arose. Return would entail continued victimisation of those suffering the consequences of 
the abuses in such situations, and increase the likelihood of recurrence in the future. In the context of 
existing structural inequalities, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights recognised in Cotton Field 
v Mexico that reparations should be designed to effect structural change and to redress the inequalities 
which gave rise or allowed for the wrongdoing to take place, stating: 
bearing in mind the context of structural discrimination [against female victims]… 
the reparations must be designed to change this situation, so that their effect is not 
only of restitution, but also of rectification. In this regard, re-establishment of the 
same structural context of violence and discrimination is not acceptable.74 
This concern with the causes of violence and the rectification of such moves reparations away from 
the strict implementation of the principle of restitutio in integrum and allows for a transformative 
approach within a judicial framework. Nevertheless the political process is more likely to be amenable 
to a flexible approach to the basis and assessment of awards, and to allow the infusion of 
transformative justice principles into the process. Political reparations processes, which are concerned 
with transformative justice, may thereby engender meaningful change for victims within their 
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particular social and political contexts in a manner which legal reparations are less apt to achieve. As 
such, effective reparations programmes should go beyond the direct, individualised redress provided 
for through court processes to address the circumstances and contributory factors of historical 
atrocities, rather than dealing only with the specific wrong and the resulting harm. 
Processes constructed on transformative justice principles are more appropriate for dealing 
with transatlantic chattel enslavement, as the foundational premise and justification for the so-called 
‘trade’ was the extreme racialisation and marginalisation of particular groups of people to be 
exploited for profit. The reincarnation of extreme inequality between people racialised as black and 
white through the decades following legal abolition of slavery belies the argument that the process of 
‘emancipation’ in itself was transformative. Individuals would still be able to benefit from reparations, 
in that they would respond to individual needs for rehabilitation, such as counselling, but also be 
aimed at redressing wider common needs of descendants of the ‘transatlantic slave trade’. 
4. REPARATIONS FOR TRANSATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE AND 
HISTORICAL ENSLAVEMENT 
When applying the rubric of reparations, it is important to ensure that the theoretical and practical 
parameters of such are met to ensure its coherence. In other words, there ought to be identifiable 
victims who have suffered harm caused by illegal or wrongful acts committed by perpetrators. Dinah 
Shelton outlines five factors which determine the likelihood of reparations being adopted in cases of 
historical injustice: (1) the perpetrator is still identifiable and living; (2) the victims, or their 
immediate descendants, are identifiable and living; (3) there is political pressure and strong, cohesive 
support from victims in demanding reparations; (4) the historical injustice is compelling and well-
documented; (5) there exists continued harm and a causal connection between present harm and the 
past injustice.75  
The schism between historical injustices and the provision of redress through both legal and 
political means is apparent in the case of the Japanese-Americans interned by the US during the 
Second World War. Despite the fact that some of those interned were unsuccessful in bringing legal 
proceedings against the government in the years after the war, it was not until the late 1980s, after 
years of political lobbying, that the US government agreed to pay compensation to each surviving 
internee.76 However, the payment itself, only $20,000 for each victim, was a symbolic gesture, a 
‘token’ that did not correspond to the severity of individuals’ suffering.77 Moreover, Peruvian-
Japanese who were abducted by American forces to be interned in the US during the same period 
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were originally excluded from the scheme, only obtaining $5,000 each after successfully challenging 
the law through the courts. Also excluded from the process were those victims who had died before 
the passing of the law in 1988, narrowing the pool of victims who were awarded compensation. 
Spouses, children and parents were only eligible for awards where the victim had survived up to the 
enactment of the legislation, but died before payment had been made.78 The extent to which Japanese-
American reparations provide support for claims relating to enslavement and other abuses crossing 
generations is therefore limited, as reparations took place only forty-three years after the conclusion of 
the war and were only awarded within the lifespan of the victims.  
The claim that it would be unjust to make present actors responsible for the wrongs of history 
holds significant sway in the public debate surrounding the issue of reparations for transatlantic 
enslavement. Kukathas argues that agents – victim and perpetrator – must be identifiable, and ‘one 
generation cannot be asked to atone for the sins of earlier ones’.79 While this critique might apply to a 
case against the descendants of slavers, it does not quash the more prevalent claims against states and 
corporations for their role in enslavement. Although the individual perpetrators of the slave trade have 
long since died, states have remained constant – particularly those European states which perpetrated 
the ‘trade’. A number of corporations that participated in human enslavement also continue to exist 
into the present, either directly or indirectly. Like a corporation, a state is “treated as a unity, 
consistent with its recognition as a single legal person in international law”.80 The individuals 
operating within a state’s organs of government therefore operate within the state as a legal entity, 
rather than constituting it. The temporal restrictions on liability which apply in the case of natural 
persons do not, therefore, apply to the state, which has a lifetime of its own. The organisational 
structures of the European ‘slaver’ states have remained largely undisturbed since the period of 
transatlantic enslavement, and the rules of state succession are unbroken. This formulation of liability 
in the hands of European nations and corporations should also be considered in relation to Arab 
slavers, who were the architects of an analogous ‘trade’ in African people in central and eastern 
Africa.  
Identifying living victims of enslavement or their immediate descendants is problematic for 
those advocating redress. Those people that directly suffered from the system of chattel enslavement 
perpetrated by European nations, and their immediate descendants, are now long-past. Meeting this 
requirement in relation to individual victims is therefore close to impossible. The claims of states that 
were the primary victims of the harms of enslavements overcome this limitation through the same 
rules of state succession, which continue the liability of perpetrator states. For instance, the 
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CARICOM claim focuses on the claims of its Caribbean member states against the European states 
that participated in the injustices in relation to their territories. Such a characterisation of the identity 
of victims would likely open the door to claims from West African states who had their populations 
ravaged by the institution of transatlantic enslavement, as well as the South American countries that 
were the primary destination for enslaved Africans.81 The CARICOM claim could also set a precedent 
for other regional organisations, such as the African Union, to claim the victim identity of member 
states. Claims constructing collectives of victims within a state may also overcome the direct victim 
limitation, although establishing a sufficiently coherent identity as to qualify as a legal entity may be 
difficult to establish.  
Collective legal identity is generally only recognised in relation to indigenous and tribal 
peoples, and may not extend to the disperse communities of the descendants of enslaved persons in 
the African diaspora.  The most apparent groups, which can establish such collective rights, have been 
indigenous people, who share the same culture, laws and history.82 That said other groups of 
individuals who have less cultural and identity bonds have been collectively recognised as having 
rights to reparations, such as victims of particular crimes (gender based or sexual violence, child 
soldiers), war widows, orphans and those disappeared.83 In such cases the strength and unity of such 
victims has been based on them organising themselves into collectives to demand reparations, thereby 
being a political pressure group, often turning to the courts to seek redress. 
In light of Shelton’s third element of political pressure and strong, cohesive support from 
victims in demanding reparations,84 claims relating to transatlantic enslavement face significant 
challenges. In the Caribbean context, official state support for the reparations agenda and the 
organisation of the CARICOM Reparations Commission, as well as national reparations commissions 
amongst member states, speaks to the increasing political will of victim states. However, these states 
face internal volatility and fracturing between the official narratives and the expectations and wishes 
of those reparationists and descendants operating at the grassroots. The requisite capacity to exert 
political pressure on the wrongdoing states may still be lacking in the CARICOM claims, as European 
states continue to deny responsibility to make reparations on the basis that the enslavement was ‘legal 
at the time’. David Cameron’s visit to Jamaica, for instance, made Britain’s refusal to engage with the 
reparations claims clear, indicating that there is not presently sufficient political leverage to get to the 
                                                     
81 Lovejoy finds that 11,698,000 individuals were exported from Africa between 1450-1900. Around 35.3% of 
all enslaved victims of the ‘transatlantic trade’ were delivered to Brazil, and 22.1% were delivered to the 
Spanish Empire predominantly in South and Central America. See Paul E. Lovejoy, The Volume Of The 
Atlantic Slave Trade: A Synthesis, Journal of African History 23 (1982) 473-501; and Hugh Thomas, The Slave 
Trade, The Story of the Atlantic Slave Trade: 1440-1870, (Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 1997).  
82 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People 2007. 
83 Nairobi Declaration. See the practice in Sierra Leone, TRC Report Vol.II, Chapter 4, paras.69-70; and in 
Timor Leste - Chega! Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor (CAVR), (2005), Part 
11, §12.9. 
84 Shelton n.35, p464. 
 19
point that responsible states involved in the slave trade will want to make a settlement on 
reparations.85  
The historical documentation of the transatlantic slave trade is extensive and sufficiently 
maintained so as to establish the nature and extent of harms committed. Shelton’s fourth factor is 
therefore easily satisfied in relation to the brutal trade. Although establishing legal wrongdoing may 
be out of reach, the moral and political claim to the severity of the injustice is compelling. Reparations 
may be awarded in cases where the perpetrators purported the legality of the abuses provided there is 
a sufficiently strong moral justification, such was the case in relation to German atrocities committed 
during World War II. Establishing continuing harm and a causal connection to the past injustice as 
required to satisfy Shelton’s fifth factor may be more difficult in relation to a system abolished in the 
1800s. Claims based on the collective impact of an injustice, as are advanced by CARICOM, require a 
sufficient causal nexus to the slave trade and Western states’ involvement in such, as well as evidence 
of that harm having translated through the generations to contemporary institutions of racism, 
deprivation and discrimination.  
There is increasing evidence to support the intergenerational impact of major injustices, with 
transgenerational harms being noted in the children and grandchildren of those who have suffered 
from political repression or conflict.86 The extent to which this travels to generations beyond 
grandchildren to the extent that claims for transatlantic enslavement require remains unclear. 
However, the effects of structural injustices can be more easily traced in such a case including the 
economic impact of enslavement and the systems of labour put in place in the Caribbean on the 
contemporary states.87 The lasting impacts of historical injustices on nations were also recognised at 
the Durban 2001 World Conference on Racism, which stated that ‘…historical injustices have 
undeniably contributed to poverty, underdevelopment, marginalization, social exclusion, economic 
disparities, instability and insecurity that affect many people in different parts of the world, 
particularly in developing countries’.88 This falls far short of the evidentiary requirements typically set 
in legal proceedings, and claimants therefore find themselves stumbling upon the limits of the law in 
addressing historical injustices. However, such research may still be persuasive in the political arena.  
Starzyk et al and Nussio et al suggest the relevance of the political ideology of the perpetrator 
state in determining the likelihood of reparations being granted. Starzyk et al suggest that reparations 
are more likely to be publicly accepted or sociably feasible where they do not compromise social 
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values.89 This can create barriers to historical claims where the dominant narratives conceive of 
people as individuals with outcomes disconnected from family and racial histories. Nussio et al also 
point to other factors that prompt reparations, such as more left-leaning political ideology or group-
based or collective understandings of guilt. This factor underscores the significance of public support 
in the viability and sustainability of reparations.90 Thus for the UK and other Western countries 
involved in the transatlantic slave trade, there would need to be significant social mobilisation and 
support for reparations by Caribbean states to overcome the typically individualistic paradigm of 
political thought. New law may be a space to create such a dialogue and framework to mobilise 
around. A multinational treaty between the Caribbean, African, European and Arab states may be a 
way forward to concentrate minds on appropriate development and symbolic reparations needed to 
address the consequences of the slave trade. 
4.1 What form of reparations would be appropriate? 
The harms of transatlantic slave trade over the course of the centuries that it was perpetuated defy 
quantification, and any attempt to do so would likely result in figures in the trillions. In 1999, for 
instance, the Afrikan World Reparations and Repatriation Truth Commission called for ‘those nations 
of Western Europe and the Americas and institutions, who participated and benefitted from the slave 
trade and colonialism’ to pay $777 trillion to Africa within five years.91 Yet as Howard-Hassmann 
points out this amount is sixty-two times the US GDP in 2005 and there is no indication of how such 
an amount was arrived at.92 Indeed she goes so far that such a huge amount of compensation 
undermines the feasibility of such reparations. Instead such measures should be ‘reasonable’ and 
‘payable without significant disadvantage to those making the payment.’93 Moreover, assessing the 
degree of damages is in most part speculative as it necessarily attempts to quantify the loss and 
suffering of millions of potential individuals and societies over the course of multiple centuries; this 
would likely frustrate the prospect of getting responsible actors around the table to negotiate.94  
The impact of intervening factors on the suffering of the descendants of enslaved persons, and 
the passage of time, compound the difficulties of assessing reparations awards, making an accurate 
determination of a proportionate award impossible. The dispersal of the victim populations, the 
degrees of separation between individual enslaved persons and their descendants, and the structural 
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and systemic nature of the continuing harms make individual compensation unfeasible in the context 
of transatlantic enslavement. Identifying individual victims and providing sufficient evidence to 
establish harm and a causal nexus would be arduous and often fruitless. Moreover, quantification of 
harms can diminish the gravity of the injustices and undermine reconciliation and meaningful 
acknowledgement of suffering. ‘Payment’ in this context can become a ‘dirty word’; perpetrators can 
be seen as attempting to obviate their culpability through ‘blood money’ designed to pay off their 
guilt, and victims can be perceived as opportunistic to benefit from the abuses.95  
It would be very difficult to establish direct or indirect intergenerational harms suffered by an 
individual descendant and caused by the harm inflicted on their ancestor. Establishing the widespread 
existence of such specific and inherited contemporary harms in large cross-sections of society would 
be even more untenable. Viewing reparations through a transformational justice lens would therefore 
be more appropriate in this context, tackling the causes and consequences of the slave trade as a 
whole as opposed to only the direct symptoms suffered by those enslaved. The mass exploitation and 
atrocities committed against enslaved people are thereby viewed as having direct harms upon their 
children, and potentially also upon subsequent generations. The system of enslavement is also 
conceived as having wider repercussions for Caribbean states. In this context it is not so much the 
direct acts of enslavement of particular persons that continue to harm the state, but the structures of 
abuses and the institutional systems put in place at the time. Du Plessis identifies that it is more 
feasible to seek reparations to address the legacy of enslavement, rather than to try and redress the 
historical injustice itself.96 This framework lends itself to the construction of collective reparations 
and symbolic measures to redress the suffering of people alive in the present.  
CARICOM’s Ten Point Reparation plan is distributive in nature given the historical nature of 
the abuse. As Teitel notes: 
With the passage of time, reparatory projects move farther from the traditional 
model of corrective justice. After time, wrongdoers don’t pay; innocents do. And, 
after time, redress goes not to original victims but to their descendants. With the 
passage of time, therefore, reparatory schemes look less like conventional 
corrective justice and more like a social distribution and political question … more 
like distributive schemes.97 
Such measures are therefore more appropriately dealt with in the political arena, rather than through 
judicial mechanisms and individual reparations. The CARICOM Ten Point Plan seeks a distributive, 
and perhaps even transformative, justice settlement that addresses structural harms connected to 
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enslavement. More broadly such reparations are transformative in renegotiating the status of 
Caribbean states and the ongoing unequal power relations with former colonial powers. 
As structural measures premised upon the legacies of enslavement rather than individual 
connections to enslaved persons, the CARICOM claim is collective in nature. Collective reparations 
are remedial measures aimed at responding to the harm suffered by a group, community or people and 
providing ‘shared benefits’ to the victim population that reflect the collective harm shared by the 
group.98 This harm can be attributable to the collective as such, or to a group of individuals who make 
up a collective, and may be based on violations directed at their identity or their belonging to the 
group. Jewish people constituted such a collective during the Holocaust.99 The CARICOM claim 
seeks to classify modern citizens suffering from the legacies of enslavement as such a collective. The 
lack of specificity in identifying individual recipients of state-based reparations poses some challenge, 
as the collective right to reparations (unlike the identification of harm) seems to be limited to a 
multiplicity of individuals in a group rather than the group itself.100 Collective reparations can include 
symbolic measures of acknowledgment, apologies, compensation, pensions, rehabilitative measures 
including physical and psychological health services, social and legal services, educational support 
and other infrastructural support. In Peru collective reparations have included educational 
scholarships, specialised healthcare, and memorials.101 Measures responsive to the needs of victimised 
populations can assist in addressing the destruction of communal bonds and culture, which was a 
significant feature of transatlantic enslavement and associated genocide against indigenous 
communities.102 
Reparations for historical injustices can serve as a lens for accountability and provide 
psychological healing to victimised populations as collectives and individuals. As Hamber and Wilson 
assert, the use of symbolic reparations, such as memorials, serve to: 
… acknowledge and recognise the individual’s suffering and place it within a new 
officially sanctioned history of trauma. Symbolic representations of the trauma, 
particularly if the symbols are personalised, can concretise a traumatic event, and 
help re-attribute responsibility. The latter stage is important because labelling 
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responsibility can appropriately redirect blame towards perpetrators and relieve 
the moral ambiguity and guilt survivors often feel.103 
Memorials can also serve as ‘vehicles for the intergenerational transmission of historical memory’,104 
cementing a collective’s sense of identity, value, and belonging, as well as helping to ensure that 
atrocities are not repeated. Yet there were millions of victims of the transatlantic slave trade, many of 
whom there may be no record, so such a memorial would unlikely to be able to sufficient document 
each individual. Instead a visual memorial in a public place can serve as permanent physical 
reminders in society’s consciousness to acknowledge, remember and not forget the atrocities of the 
past, such as the ‘Ark of Return’ memorial in UN plaza in New York opened in 2015 or the 
underwater ‘Vicissitudes’ sculpture in Grenada has now become imbued as a memorial to slaves who 
were thrown overboard. Official guarantees of non-repetition can also assist in preventing the 
reoccurrence of harms, instituted alongside concrete legislative and other measures to ensure their 
success. However, such measures need to be located not just in the Caribbean, but in African 
countries and states responsible for slavery in Europe and MENA, so as to keep alive the public 
memory of such atrocities and for them to be never repeated. 
Acknowledgement of wrongdoing is vital to the success of a reparations programme, and 
meaningful apologies are an integral aspect of such recognition. Successful apologies usually include 
an acceptance of responsibility, sincere statements of regret, a willingness to make amends and 
prevent future violations without any excuses or offensive explanations.105 A successful apology can 
meaningfully contribute to reconciliation and reparation, whereas unsuccessful apologies can simply 
add insult to injury. Insincere apologies or half-hearted acknowledgements of responsibility, for 
instance, in trying to close a chapter on the past might ‘make survivors feel that reparations are being 
used to buy their silence and put a stop to their continuing quest for truth and justice.’106 Perhaps the 
CARICOM claim should engage European and MENA states to engage on the reparations issues as a 
symbolic way to take moral responsibility, not legal, for the transatlantic slave trade and apologies 
that by today’s standards is reprehensible and efforts will be made on developmental terms with such 
affected states to heal the long term consequences of the slave trade. This may have to take the form 
of an international treaty that bars any individual, collective or state claim against those states 
involved in the slave trade, in exchange for focused development or cancellation of debt and symbolic 
reparations. 
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Development funds have been part of reparations ordered by human rights courts. By way of 
example in the Moiwana Community v Suriname case – after armed forces of Suriname attacked the 
village of Moiwana, massacred over 40 people, razed the village to the ground, forced survivors to 
flee into exile or internal displacement, and failed to adequately investigate the massacre – the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights ordered the state to set up a development fund to provide health, 
housing and educational programmes for community members.107 The development fund was to be 
represented by three members: one selected by the victim, one by the state, and the third agreed 
between the victims and the state.108 To complement this fund the Court ordered the state to provide 
more symbolic measures of a public apology and acknowledgement of its responsibility, as well as to 
construct a memorial.109 In other cases before the Inter-American Court, the Court has ordered 
extensive rehabilitative measures to communities affected by gross violations of human rights, such as 
housing and development programmes, healthcare centres, cultural education and infrastructure.110 
Such extensive infrastructure would probably be beyond the bounds of a treaty on reparations for the 
transatlantic slave trade, but directing development aid to such countries to tackle illiteracy, 
technology asymmetry and psychological rehabilitation as demanded by CARICOM. 
Such developmental or symbolic reparations can be difficult to distinguish from state 
obligations to tackle poverty and exclusion, and to provide certain services. When controlled by 
perpetrators who maintain hierarchical positions of power over victimised populations, such measures 
can represent more paternalism and charity, framing victims as a dependent group rather than as 
individuals with autonomy.111 As Gifford identifies: 
When European governments respond, as they do, to the injustices suffered by 
Black people, it is by way of development aid or anti-discrimination laws, so that 
generous Europeans appear to be bestowing benefits on poor suffering Africans. 
There is often an overtone of condescension: the Africans are suffering because 
their leaders have messed things up, but we still help.112 
While ‘development’ can be constructed and developed with input from the victims, they are framed 
as collective beneficiaries rather than as individuals with rights and agency. Framing measures as 
reparative – as connected to specific acts of wrongdoing – as well as involving affected communities 
in the construction of programmes can therefore be essential in countering these notions of 
dependency and marginalisation. Engagement with transformational reparations may be a way 
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forward in reimagining narratives of victimisation and hundreds of years of exploitation and 
continuing discrimination towards inclusivity and respect of the dignity of descendants of the 
transatlantic slave trade and historic enslavement.  
5. CONCLUSION 
Reparations are a symbolic way of accounting for a society’s past wrongdoing. No amount of money 
is ever going to undo the harm caused by gross violations of human rights. While today’s generation 
and government may be decades or even centuries removed from the atrocities of enslavement, 
colonialism and the genocide of indigenous peoples, they nevertheless indirectly benefit from the 
economic development arising from the economic exploitation of labour, capital, and land. 
Reparations look not only to the past, but to reaffirm the contemporary legal order and the morality of 
the state by recognising that such past atrocities were reprehensible. They also serve to distinguish the 
state from its predecessor, affirming that the society has advanced to meaningfully acknowledge the 
dignity and equality of all human beings. Such measures may only be symbolic, but they can provide 
for practical redress, affirmative action or the restitution of land to indigenous populations.  
It is clear that the issue of reparations for the transatlantic slave trade is not going to go away. 
CARICOM’s 10-point plan focusing on symbolic redress and rebalancing of ongoing structural 
inequalities domestically and internationally provides a way forward for opening the discussion on 
redressing the transatlantic slave trade in political and moral terms. Given the number of states 
involved, the lack of international legal basis for claiming reparations, and the passage of time, a 
multinational treaty may be the best way forward, rather than pressuring each individual state 
responsible for the slave trade. In the face of increasing racism and xenophobia across the world, 
political maturity and moral leadership in Western countries in making overtures to symbolic 
reparations to descendants of the slave trade could go a long way in reaffirming the wrongs of the past 
and promoting the value these populations bring to the international community. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
